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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
 
The District Court Erred By Granting Daily’s Motion To Suppress And By Denying The State’s 
Motion For Reconsideration 
 
A. Introduction 
 
In its Appellant’s brief, the state argued that the district court erred by granting Daily’s 
motion to suppress evidence recovered during a traffic stop, and by denying the state’s motion 
for reconsideration of that order.  (See generally Appellant’s brief.)  In response, Daily cited four 
facts found by the district court, which, Daily asserts, demonstrates that the glove compartment 
was not within the scope of the search permitted by the automobile exception and that the district 
court thus did not err in granting his motion to suppress.  Daily’s argument fails for the same 
reason the district court’s legal analysis was erroneous – the state was not required to 
demonstrate probable cause, or even specific articulable facts, indicating that there were open 
containers or evidence of possession of open containers in the glove compartment.  Instead, once 
Officer Martin possessed probable cause to search the truck, he was entitled to search any 
portion of the truck which could have concealed objects of the search, including the glove 
compartment.       
 
B. The District Court Erred By Granting Daily’s Motion To Suppress 
 
“Under the long-recognized automobile exception, police officers having probable cause 
to believe that an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime may search the 
automobile without a warrant.”  State v. Loman, 153 Idaho 573, 575, 287 P.3d 210, 212 (Ct. App. 
2012) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 
894, 897-898, 821 P.2d 949, 952-953 (1991); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 61, 266 P.3d 1161, 
1166 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 120, 266 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Ct. App. 2011); 
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State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 599, 237 P.3d 1222, 1225 (Ct. App. 2010)).  If probable cause 
exists to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, the search of any area of the 
vehicle in which the evidence might be found is authorized.  Johnson, 152 Idaho at 61, 266 P.3d 
at 1166 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–821 (1982)).  When an officer observes 
contraband in plain view inside a vehicle, the officer is justified under the automobile exception 
in searching the vehicle for additional contraband, as long as the scope of the search is limited to 
“only those places where such contraband might reasonably be found.”  State v. Anderson, 2015 
WL 7204541, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App., November 17, 2015).  
In this case, the state argued that the district court’s analysis was erroneous because the 
court: (1) utilized the “minor or innocuous” nature of an open container misdemeanor crime to 
inform its Fourth Amendment analysis; (2) analyzed and considered the officers’ subjective 
motives for the search; and (3) based its conclusion on a determination that the state failed to 
demonstrate that Officer Martin lacked probable cause, or some other articulable and 
particularized suspicion, to search the glove box specifically.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)  
Further, the state argued that application of the correct legal standards demonstrated that the 
officers had lawful authority under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement to search 
the glove compartment because the compartment was an area where “such contraband might 
reasonably be found” or which “may conceal the object of the search.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-
11.)  
In response, Daily does not directly respond to the state’s arguments regarding the legal 
standards utilized by the district court.  Instead, Daily relies upon four factual findings made by 
the court, which, Daily asserts, demonstrate that the court “did not make a legal error, but 
properly considered whether the search of the locked glove compartment was within the scope of 
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the search permitted by the automobile exception.”  (Respondent’s brief, pp.6-7.)  Specifically, 
the district court found: (1) Daily did not dispose of the open container found in the center 
console during the approximately eight minutes Daily was left alone in his truck while Officer 
Martin was waiting for a backup officer, and thus, presumably, the open container discovered in 
plain view by Officer Martin would not be found in the glove compartment; (2) Officer Martin 
did not observe any liquid or odor of alcohol emanating from either the vehicle or the glove 
compartment at any time; (3) Daily was driving alone in the truck and could presumably only 
drink one open container of alcohol at a time; and (4) while Officer Martin testified that he 
previously discovered open containers of alcohol in glove compartments, on those previous 
occasions, “it was a type [of container] that could be resealed, and not a non-resealable can such 
as those found in Daily’s vehicle.”  (Id. (citing R., pp.88-89).)    
The facts found by the district court do not demonstrate that Officer Martin’s search of 
the glove compartment was unlawful.  The relevant question before the court was not whether 
there was some particular fact, or the absence of fact, which demonstrated a likelihood that 
additional open containers would be found in the glove compartment.  As Daily acknowledges 
on appeal (Respondent’s brief, p.5), by locating the open container in plain view in the center 
console, Officer Martin already possessed probable cause that the truck contained open 
containers or evidence of Daily’s possession thereof.  At this point, the restrictions on Officer 
Martin’s search of the truck were limited, and the state was not required to demonstrate 
additional facts justifying a search of the glove compartment or any other portion of the vehicle 
in which open containers or evidence of possession of open containers might be found.  In 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-823 (1982), the United States Supreme Court 
explained: 
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A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in 
which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility 
that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.  
Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons 
also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which 
the weapon might be found.  A warrant to open a footlocker to search for 
marihuana would also authorize the opening of packages found inside.  A warrant 
to search a vehicle would support a search of every part of the vehicle that might 
contain the object of the search.  When a legitimate search is under way, and when 
its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between 
closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or between glove 
compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a 
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of 
the task at hand.  
 
 … 
  
The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower – and 
no broader – than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by 
probable cause.  Only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search 
otherwise is as the magistrate could authorize. 
 
(footnotes omitted); see also Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302 (extending the Ross rule to searches of 
containers belonging to passengers and holding, “[w]hen there is probable cause to search for 
contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers – like customs officials in the founding era 
– to examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for 
each one.  A passenger’s personal belongings, just like the driver’s belongings or containers 
attached to the car like a glove compartment, are ‘in’ the car, and the officer has probable cause 
to search for contraband in the car.”). 
The lawful scope of Officer Martin’s search was no narrower and no broader than the 
scope of a search that would have been authorized had he possessed a warrant to search the 
truck.  Therefore, just as an officer executing a search warrant on a house does not need to 
demonstrate separate articulable facts to justify the search of each closet, drawer, or container 
which might contain the objects of the search warrant, the same is true when an officer conducts 
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a search of a car pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  Similarly, just 
as Officer Martin would be lawfully permitted to search the glove compartment had he possessed 
a warrant to search the truck for open containers or evidence of open containers, he was likewise 
entitled to search the glove compartment pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
The state submits that the primary consideration in determining the scope of a search 
authorized by a warrant or the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is simply 
whether the space or container searched is physically capable of concealing the object of the 
search.  See, e.g., Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 (“Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen 
lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, 
probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify 
a warrantless search of a suitcase.  Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk 
of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.”);   
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 (“We hold that police officers with probable cause to search a car 
may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of 
the search.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487 (1985) (“We note that 
in this case there was probable cause to believe that the trucks contained contraband and there is 
no plausible argument that the object of the search could not have been concealed in the 
packages.”); State v. Fix, 730 P.2d 601, 604 (Or. App. 1986) (“The officers had probable cause to 
believe that the two male passengers had committed a crime and that evidence of that crime (the 
guns) would be in the truck.  Defendant’s purse was large enough to contain a gun.  The search 
[of the purse] was lawful.”);  see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 
388 (2009) (Thomas, J. dissenting in part) (“The Court has generally held that the reasonableness 
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of a search’s scope depends only on whether it is limited to the area that is capable of concealing 
the object of the search.”).  In the present case, because the glove compartment was capable of 
concealing open containers or evidence of Daily’s possession thereof, the compartment was 
within the lawful scope of Officer Martin’s search.  
Further, even to the extent that the factual findings made by the district court and relied 
upon by Daily on appeal have some limited relevance to the question of the scope of Officer 
Martin’s search, these findings do not demonstrate that the search of the glove compartment was 
unlawful.  Three of the four factual findings1 Daily relies on illustrate only the absence of some 
fact which, if present, would have provided additional cause to believe that the glove 
compartment specifically contained contraband.  For all of the reasons discussed above, the state 
was not required to demonstrate the existence of such individualized, articulable facts to justify 
the search of the glove compartment.  Finally, the district court’s finding that Daily was traveling 
alone, and that an individual person “could presumably only drink one open container at a time” 
(Respondent’s brief, p.6), necessarily implies that an open container of alcohol found in plain 
view of a vehicle containing only one individual does not establish probable cause to search the 
entire truck.  As Daily has acknowledged (Respondent’s brief, p.5), this is not the case, and 
Officer Martin had probable cause to believe that Daily’s truck contained contraband or evidence 
of contraband.       
 
 
                                            
1 Specifically, these findings consist of the following: (1) Daily did not dispose of the open 
container found in plain view in the center console; (2) Officer Martin did not observe liquid or 
odor of alcohol emanating from the glove compartment; and (3) Officer Martin did not 
specifically testify that he had discovered non-resealable cans of alcohol in glove compartments 
in prior traffic stops.  (Respondent’s brief, pp.6-7.) 
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CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to vacate the district court’s order granting 
Daily’s motion to suppress and the district court’s order denying the state’s motion for 
reconsideration, and to remand for further proceedings.  
 DATED this 28th day of March, 2018. 
 
 
 
      /s/ Mark W. Olson__________________________ 
      MARK W. OLSON 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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